Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors' participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors' participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors' demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors' demand.
Introduction
Despite the vast literature on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), we still know very little about investors' participation and their influence in the setting of IPO prices. While a number of important theoretical models, i.e., Rock's (1986) winners' curse hypothesis and Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) information extraction hypothesis, crucially rely on the segregation and varied participation of informed and uninformed investors, little empirical evidence is available. This is, perhaps, due to the opaque nature of the US style bookbuilding mechanism that is widely used across many markets. In this paper, we analyse investors' participation, and in particular, retail investors' participation and their influence on IPO pricing in a setting which is far more transparent than the bookbuilding mechanism in the US.
The Indian IPO market distinguishes itself from others in one important aspect 1 . Unlike the bookbuilding mechanism in US, the IPO mechanism in India is far more transparent. This transparency in the mechanism allows investors to observe two important pieces of information on a real time basis. First, investors can observe the aggregate demand at different points of the offer price range. Second, investors can also observe demand multiples (oversubscription) of different investor categories for their respective portion of the offer. Regulation requires Indian IPO firms to reserve and allocate a pre-determined quota of shares to three different investor categories: qualified institutional investors (QIBs), non-institutional investors (NIIs) and retail investors (RIIs) 2 .
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The transparency in the IPO mechanism, coupled with the fact that different investor categories participate for separate quotas of shares may have important implications for investors' participation, IPO pricing and returns. First, information available from the transparent mechanism should influence both investors' participation and the timing of that participation.
Second, prior research suggests that the nature and timing of investors' participation influences offer prices (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Degeorge et al., 2010) . Hence, transparency in the mechanism and the nature of investors' participation that it brings should exert influence on IPO pricing. Third, since informed and uninformed investors participate for a different quota of shares on offer, uninformed investors should be able to avoid the winners' curse documented in prior research (Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003) .
Using a sample of 306 IPOs issued during the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] period, the paper investigates three main issues. First, since information on the participation of institutional investors, considered as informed, is publicly available during the offer period, we examine how this information influences the participation of retail investors. While prior studies on investors' participation have used the timing (early or late) and the type of bid (market order or price limit bids) to examine the informativeness of the bids (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004) , our study examines the informativeness of bids by investor type. Second, we examine the influence of retail investors' participation on IPO pricing. We do so after controlling for a number of market, offer and firm characteristics, including the participation of institutional investors. While Derrien (2005) examines retail investors' influence in setting IPO prices, the study does not control for the participation of institutional investors. Third, since retail investors participate and are allocated shares from a separate tranche of shares on offer, we also examine whether this setting allows retail investors to earn positive returns after adjusting for allocation.
4
Prior research has examined returns earned by retail investors in a setting where they compete with informed institutional investors (Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003) .
We report several interesting findings. First, we find that aggregate demand is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. In most of the IPOs, investor demand is exclusively concentrated at the upper bound of the offer price range. In others, it is concentrated at the lower bound with very little investor participation in between the two price points.
Furthermore, we find that a large number of investors, both institutional and retail, submit only strike bids which is in contrast to the findings reported in previous research conducted in a less transparent setting (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Degeorge et al., 2010; Kandel et al., 1999) .
Second, we provide new insights into the participation of institutional and retail investor in IPOs.
We find that the transparency in the mechanism induces heavy investors' participation in the later stages of the offer period, which is particularly strong for retail investors. Importantly, we find that the early participation of institutional investors significantly influences the extent of retail investors' participation. The participation of institutional investors, on the other hand, appears to be influenced by recent market returns, size of the offer and underwriters' reputation.
Third, analysis of offer prices shows that favourable retail investors' demand contributes significantly to high offer prices. While institutional investors' demand also influences offer prices positively, the economic significance of retail investors' demand appears to be higher.
Since recent market return is also positively associated with offer prices, our analysis suggests that underwriters exploit market sentiment by setting high IPO prices in the presence of favourable uninformed demand and positive general market conditions. The paper makes a number of important contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper which examines a number of issues in an IPO mechanism which is far more transparent than those used in other IPO markets. While some prior studies on Indian IPOs have examined the effect of regulatory changes on underpricing (Bubna and Prabhala, 2010) and the influence of mandatory IPO grading (Deb and Marisetty, 2010), our paper examines the extent of investors' participation and IPO pricing in significant detail. The paper also highlights key implications of a transparent IPO mechanism for investors' participation and IPO pricing which should also be useful to market participants and regulators in less transparent markets.
Second, our study also enriches the existing evidence on the participation of institutional and retail investors. Consistent with prior evidence, we find that institutional investors participate on the basis of the information they possess, while retail investors behave as sentiment or noisy traders (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010; Degeorge et al., 2010) . More tellingly, through our analysis of evolution of demand, we provide evidence on the timing of the participation of the different investor categories. Further, while prior studies on the timing of 6 investors' participation have used aggregate investor demand (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004) , we consider the timing of investors' participation by investor type.
Third, our paper also adds to the literature that examines the determinants of retail investors' participation in IPOs. We complement Chiang et al. (2010) , who show that retail investors are influenced by returns on recent IPOs, and provide evidence that information on the participation of institutional investors also influences the participation of retail investors. Finally, our paper also extends the findings on returns earned by retail investors in IPO investment (Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003) . Our examination of allocation weighted initial returns brings to light the irrational behaviour of retail investors even in a setting where information on the participation of informed institutional investors is publicly available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 presents some of the key institutional features of the Indian IPO market. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the IPO sample and the descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the empirical evidence. Section 7 reports concluding remarks.
Related literature

Investors participation in IPOs
There is a significant body of theoretical literature that discusses investors' participation and information production in the context of IPO mechanisms. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) , for instance, model an optimal IPO mechanism and argue that the pricing and allocation discretion afforded by the bookbuilding and two-stage marketing mechanism helps underwriters extract valuable information from informed investors. Sherman (2000) models how bookbuilding creates regular groups of investors and shows how bookbuilding helps in both lowering average 7 underpricing and providing returns to investors so that they could engage in information gathering and reporting. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and Biais et al., (2002) show that Offre à Prix Minimal, a modified auction mechanism used in France, exhibits informationextraction properties similar to bookbuilding.
Using proprietary IPO data, Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) provide mixed evidence on information production in bookbuilding IPOs. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) find that more informative bids (bids which are submitted early and/or price limit bids) not only influence the offer price but also IPO allocations, evidence that is consistent with the information revelation theories. Jenkinson and Jones (2004) , on the other hand, report that bids submitted by investors are not informative for pricing purposes and instead find that the most important determinant of IPO allocation is whether the investor is viewed as a long term holder of the stock. In a survey of a large number of institutional investors participating in bookbuilding IPOs, Jenkinson and Jones (2009) find evidence that is inconsistent with the information revelation theory. They find that while only one half of the investors actually develops valuation models, the rest consider brokering relationships as the most important source for receiving favourable IPO allocations.
In the context of auction IPOs, Kandel et al. (1999) information. Further, they report that underwriters exercise significant discretion in pricing by setting the offer price below the market clearing price in a large number of IPOs.
Pricing of IPOs
Theories on information revelation and the principal-agent model discuss the setting of IPO offer prices by focusing on the role of underwriters. While the information revelation theories focus on the role of underwriters in eliciting useful information in setting IPO prices, theories on the principal-agent model focus on price setting by highlighting the potential for agency problems between the underwriter and the issuing firm. In the context of information revelation theories, which assumes that some investors are well informed about the value of the offer, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) posit that underwriters price IPOs in order to reward investors who reveal valuable information during the offer period. The partial adjustment phenomenon posited by Hanley (1993) is also consistent with information revelation theories as price revisions over the bookbuilding period and first day initial returns are positively related.
The principal-agent model which assumes that underwriters are well informed about the value of the offer, posits that underwriters face a trade-off in setting offer prices between high IPO prices leading to higher commission and high underpricing leading to reduced selling efforts. Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) 
Institutional features of Indian IPO market
Transparency in IPO selling mechanisms in India
One of the unique features of the Indian IPO market is the transparency in the offer process.
Throughout the offer period, information on the participation of various investor categories is publicly available on a real time basis on stock exchange websites where the IPO is to be listed. bookbuilding mechanism was first introduced in 1999 and quickly became the preferred IPO mechanism. The bookbuilding mechanism allowed underwriters to exercise discretion in setting IPO prices and in allocation of shares in the Qualified Institutional Investor (QIB) category.
However, in late 2005, in response to some irregularities in the market 4 , SEBI introduced a number of changes in the bookbuilding mechanism. The change in the regulation prohibited underwriters from exercising allocation discretion in the QIB category 5 . Thus, the current Indian IPO mechanism, while still referred to as bookbuilding, in practice appears more like a nondiscriminatory or uniform type of auction mechanism, similar to the one used by WR Hambrecht in the US.
Investor categories
In Indian IPOs, a separate quota of shares is made available for different investor categories.
Primarily there are three investor categories for whom shares are reserved and then allocated: 
Hypotheses
Retail investors' participation
A number of theoretical models, including Rock's (1986) winners' curse and Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) information acquisition model, assume that some investors are more informed than others. The segregation of informed and uninformed investor categories is at the heart of their models which have stimulated research that examines whether differences exist in how 13 different investor categories participate in IPOs. The evidence available hitherto strongly supports the view that some investors are more informed than others. Prior studies have shown that large institutions, a proxy for informed investors, participate highly and hence receive a larger percentage of shares in well performing IPOs issued in both bookbuilding and auction mechanisms (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010; Degeorge et al., 2010; Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Koh and Walter, 1989) .
As discussed earlier, the transparency of the IPO mechanism allows investors to observe prior demand of IPO shares. Since investors can observe the demand of other investors, it is likely that some less informed investors may simply follow those who participated earlier. In fact, prior literature has shown evidence of herding by both institutional and retail investors (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Shleifer and Summers, 1990) . We, therefore, posit the following hypothesis on retail investors' participation in Indian IPOs:
Uninformed retail investors will submit their bids for shares late in the offer period only after observing the demand by early bidders.
Pricing
The information revelation theories argue that an IPO is priced to reward investors who reveal useful information during the IPO process. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop an information acquisition model where underwriters underprice the offer as a reward to informed investors who provide valuable information about the intrinsic value of the firm. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) provide empirical evidence of the information acquisition hypothesis and show that investors submitting early bids, as well as bids that carry information, are rewarded by underwriters. They 14 further show that price limit bids have a significant influence on the final IPO price determined by the underwriters.
While information revelation theories were developed on the US style bookbuilding mechanism, Degeorge et al. (2010) show that information revealed during an auction is equally useful in setting IPO prices. They report highly elastic demand curves and find that the demand of institutional investors has a significant influence on the offer price. Information available from the transparent Indian IPO mechanism allows us to observe informative bids for a large sample of IPOs. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: (2005), we formulate the following hypothesis:
The IPO price will be positively related to the demand of uninformed retail investors.
Allocation weighted returns for retail investors
Rock ( and Chittorgarh (considered to be India's primary IPO investment portal 10 ).
Descriptive statistics 5.2.1. IPO sample
In this section we present descriptive statistics of our sample of IPOs. 17 (13%). This is much higher than those reported by studies using IPO data from the US and other developed markets, but is similar to initial returns reported in other emerging markets.
<<Insert Table 1 here>>
To account for changes in the market conditions from the time of the offer to the listing date, we calculate market adjusted returns 12 . The mean (median) market adjusted first day return over our sample period is 21% (10%) while the one month market adjusted mean (median) initial return is 18% (8%). Of particular interest is the number of IPOs with a negative return on the first day of trading. More than a third of the total IPOs (111 of 306) have negative returns on the first day of trading suggesting that the IPOs are not only overpriced but also that the underwriters' activity, in the after-market to support the prices of the IPOs they manage, is very limited. The overall demand for IPOs is captured by the total demand multiple. The mean (median) overall total demand multiple is 20.51 (8.08) times which suggests that Indian IPOs are well subscribed.
Following Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) (CG hereafter), we also present the average offer price and the quantity adjusted average limit price, both normalized to the offer price range. We find that both average offer price and average limit price in our sample is significantly higher than those reported by CG. CG report a mean (median) normalized offer price and average limit price of IPOs that do not have price limit bids in our sample is much higher than the 5% (2 out of 37)
reported in the CG sample. Further, we find that strike bids account for more than 90% of all bids submitted in 201 IPOs (71% of the total sample). Results are similar for bookbuilding and auction IPOs. Thus, the overall percentage of price limit bids that we document in our sample is not as a result of having a sizeable portion of price limit bids as in CG but rather, it is on account of having a few IPOs in which investors bid disproportionately at the lower bound of the demand schedule. Further, the low normalized quantity adjusted average limit price of our IPO sample, which is only 0.22 compared to 0.49 in CG, also suggests that price limit bids are mostly at the lower end of the demand schedule.
Empirical results
Investor participation
In this section we analyse the evolution of investors' demand over time and examine the determinants of investor participation in IPOs. The IPO offer is generally open for subscription for five days 14 . For this part of our analysis we use a smaller data set of 195 auction IPOs for which we have complete data on investors' demand over time.
In panel A of demand, we also include the log of one plus the cumulative demand multiple of QIBs at the end of the third day (LnDmtlQIB 2 ). The result of the regression analysis is shown in Table 4 where the reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All our regressions also control for the year fixed effects. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the log of one plus the cumulative demand multiple for QIBs (LnDmtlQIB 1 ) and NIIs (LnDmtlNII 1 ) at the end of the penultimate day, while the dependent variable in regressions (3) to (5) is the log of one plus the final demand multiple for RIIs (LnRII 0 ).
<<Insert Table 4 here>>
Results from regression (1) suggest that the early participation of QIBs is significantly higher in larger IPOs. Further, the early participation of QIBs is also likely to be higher in periods following high recent market returns and in IPOs managed by reputed underwriters. Regression (2) shows that the early participation of QIBs has a positive and significant influence on the participation of NIIs. The negative coefficient on the underwriter's reputation variable, along with insignificant coefficients on recent market returns, volatility and the size of the offering, suggests that NIIs tend to invest in an unpredictable manner and appear to be less well informed.
Regression (3) examines the determinants of RIIs' participation for the overall sample 16 . We find that the coefficient on early QIB (LnDmtlQIB 1 ) demand is both positive and significant which is consistent with our hypothesis. In fact the early participation of QIBs explains almost one third of the variation in RIIs' participation. Further, when we include the size of the offer, the two variables explain almost fifty percent of the variation in RII participation. In regressions (4) and (5) we segregate the IPOs into two categories: those with strong and weak demand. As discussed earlier, we consider IPOs with strong demand as those which are fully subscribed by the QIBs two days prior to the close of the offer period. In both regressions (4) and (5) the coefficient on early QIB participation remains positive and significant. Thus, the influence of the participation of QIBs on RIIs is not only limited to strong IPOs, it is equally influential in the case of weak IPOs. Thus our result suggests that RIIs appear to follow informed investors when information on the participation of informed investors is available. The coefficient on LnGpcds is negatively related to RII participation which is most likely to be a reflection of the size effect as our dependent variable, the demand multiple, is likely to be higher for smaller issues than for larger issues. Our regression results also show that while recent market returns have a positive influence on the participation of retail investors, market volatility has a negative impact on their participation.
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The pricing of IPOs
In this section we analyse the determinants of IPO offer price by conducting a multivariate regression analysis with the normalized issue price (NorPrice) (to the price range) as in CG, as our dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 5 where the reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All our regressions also control for year fixed effects. In regression (1) we regress the normalized IPO price on the average limit price (AvLimitPr). Consistent with CG, we find that the coefficient on the average limit price is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the limit prices contained in the demand schedule do influence the final offer price. However, as discussed earlier, the significant average limit price is due to the high demand at the lower bound of the price range in some IPOs. Hence, in regression (2) we re-run the analysis with the log of one plus the total demand multiple (LnDmtl). We find that LnDmtl has a positive and statistically significant impact on the normalized price. In fact, the total demand multiple explains more of the variation in the normalized price than the average limit price. In regression (3) we include both average limit price and total demand multiple and find that the economic significance of total demand multiple is almost three times that of the average limit price. Although a large number of IPOs do not have price limit bids, for IPOs in which such bids occur, they are highly significant in determining the offer price and hence the finding is consistent with hypothesis 2.
<<Insert Table 5 here>>
In regression (4) we include the elasticity of demand observed at the average price limit. The coefficient on the elasticity of demand is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that higher elasticity is associated with more conservative pricing. Since the elasticity of demand at the limit price is mostly concentrated at the lower bound of the demand curve, it is only natural that the higher elasticity leads to a relatively lower normalized offer price. In regression (5) As shown in regression (5), the coefficients on both the QIB and RII demand multiples are positive and highly significant. This suggests that demand from both informed as well as uninformed sentiment investors have an influence on IPO prices. More importantly, our finding on the influence of RIIs' demand on offer price is consistent with hypothesis 3 even when we control for QIBs' demand. Moreover, the size of the two coefficients suggests that the influence of RII demand is higher in setting high offer prices than the QIB demand. Further, recent market returns have a significant and positive influence on the offer price. Hence, underwriters appear to exploit market sentiments by setting high IPO offer prices in times of favourable demand from uninformed investors and favourable general market conditions.
Our regression results also appear to suggest that reputed underwriters are more likely to set a more conservative price than less reputed ones. The mechanism variable is insignificant, suggesting that there is little difference in the way prices are set in the two allocation mechanisms. Similarly, coefficients for size of the issue, age of the firm and hi-tech IPOs are insignificant. In regression (6), we replicate model (5) by leaving out the average limit price and elasticity variables to run the regression on the entire sample of 306 IPOs. Overall, our results 26 remain the same although the explanatory power of the model drops as a consequence of leaving out these two important variables.
Allocation weighted initial returns 17
Next, we examine the allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors. Since investors in each category participate and receive an allocation from their respective quota of shares, it will be interesting to observe how retail investors fare after taking into account the overall demand of the issue. The unique feature of the Indian IPOs means that while retail investors may receive higher allocations in poor IPOs, they will not be crowded out by informed institutional investors in a good quality offering 18 . For this part of our analysis we follow Amihud et al. (2003) and assume that retail investors subscribe to a fixed amount in each and every IPO. Since retail investors are required to deposit the total amount that they bid for at the time of bidding, their funds are tied up on average for about 36 days. On average, IPO firms are listed 21 days after the closing of the issue and IPO firms are mandated to refund unsuccessful bidders within 15 days of the listing date. For the purpose of calculating the interest expense, we use the State Bank of India's advance rate prevailing for each year in our sample period, which is available from the Reserve Bank of India Fact Book. The average interest for 36 days during the period of our study is 1.09%.
<<Insert Table 6 here>> 17 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting to us that we examine the allocation weighted returns for retail investors. 18 Since regulation allows underwriters to re-allocate unsubscribed shares of QIB and NII investor categories to RIIs, RII investors may end up receiving higher allocations in offerings which are undersubscribed by other investor categories.
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In Table 6 we present the allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors after the first day (AWMIR 1 ), first week (AWMIR 7 ) and first month (AWMIR 30 ) of listing 19 . We use returns on the BSE Sensex to calculate the market adjusted returns. Results show that while the mean allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors is not significantly different from zero for the first day and first week returns, it is negative and statistically significant for the first month returns. Hence, our results are not consistent with hypothesis 4. Thus, the negative and dummy variables to control for year fixed effects. Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 7 where in regressions (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables are the first day, first week and first month allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns respectively.
<<Insert Table 7 here>>
As shown in Table 7 , LnDmtlQIB is positive and statistically significant across all the three regressions. Further, while the MktVol is positive and significant for the first day and first week returns, it is insignificant for the first month returns. Mkt3Mw, is insignificant in all the three regressions. This is because, as shown in Table 4 , LnDmtlQIB is highly influenced by Mkt3Mw and hence some variation in Mkt3Mw is captured by the variation in LnDmtlQIB. Other variables do not appear to have any significant impact on the allocation weighted initial returns. Thus, the findings show that retail investors can significantly enhance their allocation weighted initial returns by subscribing to IPOs with high QIB demand.
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<<Insert Table 8 here>> To further examine the allocation weighted returns that retail investors can earn by conditioning their subscription on QIB demand we analyse AWMIR by quartile of QIB investors' demand.
The analysis presented in Table 8 shows that retail investors can earn positive initial returns by only subscribing to those IPOs in which QIB demand is above average. The findings show that retail investors can significantly enhance their allocation weighted initial returns by avoiding IPOs with very low QIB demand. In fact, the difference in AWMIR 30 between IPOs with below median and above median QIB demand is 17.64% and the difference is highly significant. Since retail investors do not have to compete directly with institutional investors, they can earn returns which are significantly higher than zero even when institutional demand is high.
Conclusions
One of the most controversial features of the bookbuilding mechanism, as it is practised in the US and in most other markets, is its complete lack of transparency. In general, the bookbuilding mechanism is opaque and offers little information on how different investors participate in IPOs and how underwriters set the IPO offer price. This lack of transparency has not only hindered our understanding of the IPO process, it has also, as critics of bookbuilding argue, encouraged quid pro quo relationship between underwriters and institutional investors. The Indian IPO market provides us with a unique setting where the bookbuilding is far more transparent and as a consequence investors are able to observe the demand of prior investors. The transparency in the Indian IPO mechanism enables us to examine the complete demand schedule, demand over time as well as the demand of different investor categories in both auction and a modified version of 30 bookbuilding mechanism. We use the Indian setting to examine investors' participation, and in particular the participation of retail investors, and its impact on IPO pricing.
Using a sample of 306 IPOs over a 10 year period from January 2001 to December 2010, we find that the transparency in the IPO mechanism creates demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of evolution of demand over the offer period reveals that while large institutional investors, owing to their superior information, subscribe early compared to other investor categories, retail investors appear to follow institutional investors. We find that favourable demand by retail investors is one of the most significant contributors to high IPO offer prices and our results hold even when we control for the demand by informed institutional investors. Finally, our examination of allocation weighted initial returns suggests that, on average, retail investors are unlikely to make positive initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can make significant positive initial returns if they limit their participation in only those IPOs which attract above average demand from well informed institutional investors. Age is the difference between a firm's IPO year and the founding year. Total assets is the total assets of the firm for the quarter prior to the IPO as reported in the offer document. Gross proceeds is the gross proceeds of the offer calculated by multiplying the offer price with the number of shares offered. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for the last quarter prior to the IPO. Raw first day return (IR 1 ) is the simple return calculated between IPO offer price and the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. Market adjusted first day return (MIR 1 ) is the difference between raw first day return (IR) and the market returns over the same period of time. Market return is the simple return calculated between the index value on the offer date and the date of listing. We use the BSE Sensex as our measure of the market return. Market adjusted one month return is the difference between the simple one month IPO return and the market return over the same period of time. Total demand multiple is the ratio of the investors' demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of shares offered. QIB demand multiple is the ratio of the Qualified Institutional Buyers' (QIBs) demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of shares offered to the QIB category. NII demand multiple is the ratio of the Non-Institutional Investors' (NIIs) demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of shares offered to the NII category. RII demand multiple is the ratio of the Retail Individual Investors' (RIIs) demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of shares offered to the RII category. IPO offer price (normalized) is the normalized issue offer price by the initial price range. Limit price (normalized) is the quantity weighted average of all limit prices normalized by the initial offer price range. (1 US$ approximately equal to INR 45). at different points of the price range for the overall sample and separately for bookbuilding and auction IPOs. For demand at below and above the mid-point we aggregate all demand between those points. We use the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference in medians between IPO allocation mechanisms. Panel B shows the number of IPOs that receive certain proportion of total bids as strike bids by allocation mechanism. The Less than 30% category shows the number of IPOs in which strike bids account for less than 30% of the total bids. The 30-60% category shows the number of IPOs in which strike bids account more than 30% but less than 60% of the total bids and so forth. The More than 99% category shows the number of IPOs in which more than 99% of the total bids was in the form of strike bids. Strike bids are the sum of all the price cut-off bids submitted by retail individual investors (RIIs) and the bids submitted at the upper bound by all investor categories. Since the Indian IPO price range has never been revised upward, submitting a bid at the upper bound of the price range is effectively submitting a strike bid. .845*** -3.088*** -2.809*** -2.607*** -0.568 Panel A shows the number of IPOs in which the shares reserved for various investor categories are fully subscribed over the offer period. Day 0 is the final bidding day of the offer period while Day 4 is the first day of offer for most of the sample IPOs. The sample consists of 195 auction IPOs for which we have data on investors' participation over time. There are two IPOs in which the total demand multiple is just below 1. Panel B shows the number of IPOs in which the shares reserved for various investor categories are fully subscribed over the offer period by IPOs with strong and weak QIBs (institutional investors) demand. IPOs are considered to be strong if QIBs fully subscribe to their portion of the offer by the end of the third day of bidding period (Day 2 in this table). We use the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the difference in median in investor participation between the two IPO categories. *** denote the difference is significant at less than 1% level. 30 are the first day, first week and first month allocation weighted initial returns. Allocation weighted initial return is calculated as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India's (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. The t and z statistics test that the mean and median are different from zero.
Appendix B: List of Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIB)
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Figure 1: Allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors
This figure shows the distribution of the first month allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors. Allocation weighted initial return is calculated as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India's (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. This figure presents the scatter plot for first day market adjusted initial returns and the allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors. Allocation weighted initial return is calculated as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India's (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. (1), (2) and (3) is allocation weighted first day, first week and first month market adjusted initial returns respectively. We calculate allocation weighted market adjusted initial return by dividing market adjusted initial returns by RII demand multiple and subtracting it from interest expenses. Mkt3Mw is the weighted average of the buyand-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months before the IPO date where weights are 3 for the recent month, 2 for the next and 1 for the third month before the offering. MktVol is standard deviation of the index returns one month prior to the offer issue date. LnDmtlQIB, is the logarithm of 1 plus demand multiple (total share bid at or above the offer price divided by the total shares offered) of qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). LnGpcds is the logarithm of gross proceeds. HiTech is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs in the information technology and biotechnology industries and 0 otherwise. Mechanism is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for bookbuilding IPOs and 0 for auction IPOs. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *** and * indicate statistical significance at less than 1% and 10% levels. & AWMIR 30 are the allocation weighted market adjusted first day, first week and first month initial returns. Market adjusted initial returns are raw initial returns adjusted by return on the BSE Sensex over the same period of time. Allocation weighted market adjusted initial return is calculated as market adjusted initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India's (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. Figures in parenthesis show t-statistics which examine whether the mean is different from zero. Diff is the difference in AWMIR between IPOs with above and below median QIB investors' demand.
